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Christian Häberli† and Fiona Smith‡ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
On the face of it all is clear and simple. In order to feed over 9 billion people by the year 2050 
much more research and technological development (R&D) and investment will be neces-
sary.1 As late as 2008, the World Bank lamented a decade-old neglect of under-investment 
and a decreasing relative share of technical assistance, including in its own projects, and en-
couraged greater investment to address food security concerns.2 Attracting such investment is 
important in food deficit countries that experience low relative yields for their agricultural 
production. Foreign direct investment (FDI)3 can play a crucial role because it can mean that 
the right quantities reach food deficit areas at the right moment.4 Unsurprisingly, such gov-
ernments are interested in more investment. A plethora of guarantees and incentives for FDI 
are offered, often going far beyond what states’ own nationals can expect. However, FDI is 
not always the answer to food security problems. In reality it can be very much a two-edge 
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1 Also considering the implications of climate change on food security, and increased demand for meat in emerg-
ing economies – such investments are required on an unprecedented level. The Food and Agriculture Organisa-
tion (FAO) has calculated a necessary increase of 70% in food, feed and bioenergy production, and annual 
(mostly private) investment needs for agriculture and rural development reaching $30.5bn. Cf. Concept Note to 
the High-Level Forum of Experts on “How to Feed the World in 2050” (Rome, 12-13 October 2009). 
2 Food security goes beyond food production and consumption. See generally World Bank, The World Bank 
Annual Report 2008, Year in Review, (2008). 
3 Note not all foreign investments qualify as FDI: only those where a foreign actor invests in assets for the pur-
poses of production: Jägerskog, Cascão, Härsmar & Kim: Land Acquisitions: How Will They Impact Trans-
boundary Waters, (2012) Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI Report), 14. In this article we use the 
term FDI in a large sense. 
4 Committee on World Food Security: Policy Roundtable: Land Tenure and International Investment in Africa, 
(September 2010) FAO, CFS:2010/7, para 9; Colen, Maertens & Swinnen: “Foreign Direct Investment as an 
Engine for Growth and Human Development: A Review of the Arguments and Empirical Evidence: (2009) 3 
Hum.Rts. & Int’l Legal Discourse 177. 
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 2
sword, especially for weak states.5 The key is therefore to obtain the maximum positive ef-
fects from FDI, whilst simultaneously mitigating the negative effects. The best way to achieve 
this is by ensuring there is an adequate system of governance in place. 
 
This paper will argue that FDI in agriculture is governed by a series of overlapping interna-
tional and regional treaty obligations that interact with the terms of the various bilateral in-
vestment treaties (BITs) and the national law of the host state (the state in which the invest-
ment occurs). This creates a multilevel system of governance for FDI in agriculture that cre-
ates obligations and responsibilities for the host state, the investor and the investor’s home 
state (the state in which the investor is incorporated).6  
 
We will argue that this system of obligations and responsibilities is unevenly distributed, in 
such a way that it impacts adversely on the host state’s food security. We will show that this 
uneven distribution can be attributed to the lack of legally enforceable ‘hard rules’ in the in-
ternational and regional treaties that could potentially protect the host state’s food security, 
and the plethora of hard rules that can be enforced to protect the investor. We will argue that 
this over protection and under regulation of agriculture FDI is particularly problematic in 
weak states. This is because such states need to attract FDI to supplement their insufficient 
and underperforming agricultural production, but they often lack the institutional capacity to 
monitor the investor’s behaviour, and also the capacity to ensure that their food security is not 
undermined by the investment.7 We will show that, in some cases, inadequate control of agri-
cultural FDI can even result in the host state violating its other international legal obligations, 
especially the right to food.8 This situation is unlikely to be ameliorated by separate action 
taken by individuals enforcing their human rights within the host state because weak states 
often have information dissemination problems that mean affected citizens frequently cannot 
                                                 
5 The general human rights implications of these problems for weak states is discussed by Telesetsky: “Resource 
Conflicts over Arable Land in Food Insecure States: creating a United Nations Ombudsman to review Foreign 
Agricultural Land Leases” (2011) 1 Goettingen J.Int’l.L. 283. 
6 It is difficult in a short piece to delve deeply into every possible facet of this argument. Instead we chart the 
main arguments and leave more specific reflections for later research. On multi-level governance see Marks & 
Hooghe: “Unraveling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance” (2003) 97 American Political 
Science Review 233. 
7 There is even a question whether traditional farming methods produce yields sufficient to feed the national 
population in weak states anyway. See Häberli: “Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or In-
vestment Opportunity?” Paper prepared for 2012 Annual Conference of the Society of International Economic 
Law, 12-14 July 2012. 
8 De Schutter, The Right to Food, A/65/281, 11 August 2010, United Nations. 
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be made aware of their rights.9 Likewise, although the investor’s home state may act extra-
territorially to regulate the investor’s behaviour within the host state, this intervention is only 
undertaken under specific conditions and is never automatic.10 Such action will also not nec-
essarily promote the host state’s food security obligations, but may be undertaken to promote 
different objectives important to the investor’s home state, like the enforcement of stronger 
labour rights, for example.11  
 
The paper is in three sections. First we will set out the positive effects agricultural FDI can 
have even in weak states together with a determination of how such FDI might also adversely 
affect their food security. Second, we will analyse the system of multilevel governance cover-
ing agricultural FDI at both the pre-investment and post-establishment stage, in particular 
highlighting that the different hard and soft law rights and duties on the investor, the host state 
and (where relevant) the investor’s home state.12 In this section, we will show how this multi-
level governance leads to over protection and under regulation of the investor to the detriment 
of the host state’s food security. In the final section we will set out a proposal for a ‘public 
interest’ clause to be inserted into the BIT to benefit the host state. It is our belief that this 
clause will help to ameliorate the imbalance between the over protection and under regulation 
of agricultural FDI that we identify in the second section.  
 
2. The Effects of Agricultural FDI in Weak States 
FDI can promote global food security directly if it leads to a net-increase in productivity 
and/or the production of food crops. It is certainly true that in many countries there is ample 
land available for such cultivation. According to World Bank estimates, in Mozambique, Tan-
zania and Zambia only 12 % of arable land is currently cultivated.13 Rather surprisingly, this 
                                                 
9  World Bank, Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? (2011),15 
& Fiesseha: A Case Study of the Berchera agricultural development project, Ethiopia, (2011) International Land 
Coalition. There is also a real question about capacity to enforce some of the obligations anyway: Fisseha ibid. 
10 Narula: “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under International Law” (2005-6) 44 Col-
um.J.Transnat’l.L. 691, 728-738. 
11 See below section 3 infra. 
12 Our focus is on regional and international regulation and so the hosts state’s domestic legal system will only 
be discussed to the extent that it is relevant to this analysis. For more detail on problems in domestic legal sys-
tems see generally Rising Global Interest in Farmland above n9. In this article we argue that the soft law obliga-
tions are weaker instruments. For a contrary view see Kaufmann-Kohler: “Soft Law and International Arbitra-
tion: Codification and Normativity” (2010) 1 J. Int’l. Dispute Settlement 83. 
13 Cf. Vera Songwe and Klaus Deininger, Foreign Investment in Agricultural Production: Opportunities and 
Challenges. Agricultural and Rural Development Notes, The World Bank, Washington, (January 2009), 2. 
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is the case even in China.14 The consequences for the host state (the state in which the invest-
ment is made) on its food security of FDI are varied however.  
 
Some studies show that the host state is unlikely to be able to rely on the food produced by the 
investor to meet its own direct domestic food security needs, as most of the food is exported.15 
For example, Saudi Star Agricultural Development plc acquired 200,000 thousand hectares of 
prime arable land in Ethiopia in 2009 on which to grow cereals. All cereals grown on the land 
were intended for export to Saudi Arabia. Whilst this will no doubt support Saudi Arabia’s 
food security requirements, inevitably the food itself will not reach the citizens of Ethiopia.16  
 
The impact on a host state’s food security can even be negative, as cash crop exports can sub-
stitute local food production. This happens if local farmers are illegally displaced as a result 
of the purchase (or expropriation), or long-term lease of large portions of their agricultural 
land on which they previously grew crops, or where their cattle previously grazed. These are 
the so-called ‘land grab’ cases.17 Domestic agricultural production then can cease completely, 
or may be substantially reduced.18 The remaining portions of land following acquisition may 
be so small that it is no longer economic for the local producers to cultivate the land even if 
they are permitted to do so by the investor.19 Displacement may also occur because the local 
producer can earn more money as, for example, a security guard, than he could as a farmer.20 
Former (individual or communal) landowners themselves will be more food insecure if they 
can no longer work their (leased) land, or get adequate compensation or new jobs.21 
 
Some commentators also argue that further negative pressure on food security for the host 
state also occurs as large-scale FDI in food exports and fuel crops increases pressure on water 
supplies for neighbouring food croppers with the consequence that the investment is in reality 
                                                 
14 The Economist, 3 December 2011. 
15 Note that we mean the food itself is exported. However, there may be indirect benefit to food security. This is 
discussed below infra. 
16  Fisseha, above n 9, 9. 
17 For the definition of ‘land grab’ see International Land Coalition: ‘Securing Land Access for the Poor in Tines 
of Intensified Natural Resources Competition’ (27 May 2011),‘Tirana Declaration,’ para 4: 
http://www.landcoalition.org/about-us/aom2011/tirana-declaration. Stevens: “The Global Land Grab” (2011) 
XX(1) International Affairs Review, 1. 
18 Fisseha above n 9,34 
19 Fisseha above n 9, 21. 
20 Fisseha above n 9, 20.  
21 Land grab clearly has a negative impact on these former landowners’ ‘right to food.’ This is an issue we will 
return to in the next section: On the right to food generally see De Schutter, above n 8. 
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a "virtual water export."22 As the Stockholm Institute noted in 2012, “a land investment is 
very much a water investment, though water is rarely in the contract.”23 Traditional agricul-
tural production in much of Sub-Saharan Africa is rain-fed and relies on access to rivers and 
aquifers when the rains fail.24 However, large-scale FDI tends to rely more on irrigation 
which draws water straight from those rivers and aquifers, which in turn may lead to a reduc-
tion in the water available for traditional domestic production in the host state, and, potential-
ly a loss of water downstream for other states’ agricultural production when the river is part of 
a shared water basin and the FDI is located in an area with inadequate rainfall.25 For example, 
many large FDI projects in Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia are located at transboundary 
water basins on the Nile river delta.26 
 
The host state’s food security may in fact derive some indirect benefit from the investment.27 
In general, FDI helps reverse the trend towards chronic underinvestment in agriculture in 
many sub-Saharan African states that was highlighted by the World Bank.28 Countries like 
Tanzania, Sudan and Zambia, for example, tried to kick-start their own domestic agricultural 
production in order to support their citizens’ food security needs. A lack of public funding, 
coupled with poor technology and management of the large farms, saw these initiatives fail.29 
Carefully managed foreign investment could enable up to 6 million hectares of additional ag-
ricultural land to be cultivated by 2030.30 This rise in agricultural FDI is also important for the 
host state, as the investor will at least provide foreign exchange and tax revenues (like any 
traditional cash crop exports such as coffee and bananas, or biofuels), which that state can use 
to buy food on the global market, or, in some cases re-invest in increasing food crop produc-
                                                 
22 Chartres: “Water and Food Security” in R. Rafuse & N. Weisfelt (eds), The Challenge of Food Security: In-
ternational Policy and Regulatory Frameworks, (2012) Edward Elgar, 162. 
23 SIWI Report above n 3, 8. 
24 SIWI Report ibid., 10. 
25 Note that biofuel production, especially of sugarcane, uses an estimated 1% of global irrigated water: SIWI 
report ibid., 14. 
26  SIWI Report ibid.,,9 
27 “Indirect” in this context is used to denote the fact that the host state will not acquire any agricultural produc-
tion directly from the investor under the terms of the investment itself.  
28 Rising Global Interest in Farmland above n 9, xxv. 
29 Ibid., xxx. 
30 Ibid.,, 16. Note that this is this is land that could be brought into cultivation with careful investment. This is 
not the same as the large-scale increase in FDI which involves large-scale acquisition of land. This acquisition 
can be virgin land, but can also be existing land where some form of land tenure rights exist: see W. Anseeuw, L. 
Alden Wily, L. Cotula & M. Taylor: Land Rights and the Rush for Land, (2012) International Land Coalition, 4. 
This report argues that and deals between 2000-2011 amounted to a total of 203 million hectares. 
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tion.31 Local producers may also enter into partnership agreements or production contracts 
with an investor, for instance for crops like sugar cane and oilseeds. Production of these 
crops, in particular, benefit from the local producers’ cultivation knowledge together with 
capital and technology from the investor.32  
 
The key to gaining these positive benefits from FDI in agriculture is good management of the 
various projects to ensure the host state derives maximum benefit for all their development 
needs, without the detrimental effects on their food security. Such management will be greatly 
facilitated if robust ‘hard’ law underpins it. Although this would be the ideal position, the re-
ality is less optimistic for weak states.  
 
3. How are the key FDI challenges to Food Security currently 
regulated? 
A complex web of over 3,000 bilateral investment treaties (BIT) and regional trade agree-
ments (RTA) promote and protect agricultural FDI against a number of risks, including ex-
propriation. This system of regulation often offers greater guarantees for foreign investors 
against expropriation, easier access to courts and enhanced compensation possibilities than 
domestic investors enjoy.33 At first glance it appears that this regulation provides comprehen-
sive control over agricultural FDI. In reality that regulation places stringent obligations on the 
host state vis-à-vis the investor through international and regional treaties, as well as the BIT, 
but under-regulates the investor in two ways: first, it can prevent policy reforms, for instance 
for better labour or environmental protection (“regulatory chill”).34 Secondly, as will be seen 
below it may even undermine the host state’s food security obligations. This over-protection 
and under-regulation of agricultural FDI manifests itself in different ways at the pre- invest-
ment and post- establishment stages. 
a. Pre-Investment Stage  
Food Security, FDI and the Host State 
                                                 
31 Re-investment may be problematic for weak states where the investment takes the form of ‘land grab’ of the 
prime agricultural land: Liversage: Responding to ‘Land Grabbing’ and Promoting Responsible Investment in 
Agriculture, (2011) IFAD. 
32 E.g. Senegal, Rising Global Interest in Farmland above n 9, 34. 
33 Large-scale investment in weak states is not necessarily confined to foreign investors: World Bank, Rising 
Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? (2011), xxxii. 
34 This point is addressed in more detail below in ‘post-investment’ See generally on regulatory chill: Matua & 
Howse: “Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organisation” (2001) 
Human Rights in Development Yearbook 51. 
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According to multilaterally agreed definitions, food security exists when “all people, at all 
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to 
meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”35 All states must 
“halt immediately the increase in- and to significantly reduce- the number of people suffering 
from hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity.”36 To this end, states must “adopt a strategy 
consistent with [their] resources and capacities” that alleviates hunger in the short term and 
enables “all people to attain sustainable food security” in the long term.  
 
Food security is understood here mainly through a national lens. It is the responsibility of 
each state to determine its food security needs, to consult with various stakeholders regarding 
what policies may be appropriate for that state and how those policy objectives might be im-
plemented. It is then up to the state to design and implement that policy effectively within its 
own jurisdiction.37 The policy must at least guarantee access to food, or the means to provide 
it, as a minimum obligation; it is, however, not incumbent on the state to directly feed people 
per se, nor to ‘do no harm’ generally to its citizens with its other policies.38 Clearly, the state 
can exceed the minimum commitment to the extent that it is appropriate for it to do so as part 
of its national food security strategy.39  
 
Encouraging responsible agricultural FDI is not merely an aspirational part of the obligation 
to realise food security within the host state, it is instead regarded as a critical part of that 
state’s food security strategy.40 As the World Food Summit Plan of Action itself points out, 
FDI in agriculture actively contributes to food security when it enables access to factors of 
agricultural production, new technology that results in increased yields, more effective pro-
cessing and better storage post harvest in a “sustained,” “timely and reliable” way over the 
                                                 
35 World Food Summit, Plan of Action, Rome, 13 November 1996, para 1. “Social” was added in the 2009 Dec-
laration of the World Summit on Food Security, 16-18 November 2009, para 2, WFS 2009/2. 
36 Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security ibid.,, para 1.  
37 Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security 2009 above n 35, Principle 1. 
38 It is clear that a state’s trade policies, especially its use of domestic and export subsidies, can harm food securi-
ty: see Häberli: “Food Security and the WTO Rules” in B. Karapinar and C. Häberli (eds): Food Crises and the 
WTO: World Trade Forum (2010) Cambridge University Press, 297-322 The Rome Principles do not place any 
wider obligation on the state to consider the impact of all its policies on food security. 
39 Principle 1 above n 35.The problems of regulating FDI within specific weak states themselves has been dis-
cussed extensively elsewhere and will not form part of this article: see Cotula: “‘Land Grabbing’ in the shadow 
of the law: legal frameworks regulating the global land rush” in Rayfuse & Weisfelt (eds) above n 22, 272. 
40 An approach that was reiterated by the G8 in the L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security, 2009 G8 
Summit, http://www.ifad.org/events/g8/statement.pdf.  
DRAFT FOR SIEL (SINGAPORE 12-14 JULY 2012) NOT FOR QUOTE OR COPY 
Comments by 31 August 2012 are welcome. 
 8
short, medium and long term.41 It is also positive when it leads to greater employment oppor-
tunities for households that would otherwise be food insecure.42  
 
At the pre-investment stage therefore, the host state should only welcome agricultural FDI 
that actively reduces the negative externalities and boosts its positive effects.43 Principle 2 of 
the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and 
Resources (PRAI) also strongly supports this position and suggests only FDI that “generate[s] 
desirable social and distributional impacts and does not increase vulnerability” will meet 
states’ food security obligations.44  
 
FDI with a positive impact on national food security is therefore investment that actually 
gives the domestic producers access to those factors of production and new technology, and 
increases domestic employment.45 The host state must focus on encouraging FDI that is based 
on innovative business models like contract farming, outgrower schemes and joint ventures 
with local producers.46 On the negative side there are cases of FDI that result in the creation 
of the ‘mega farms’ that can displace domestic production and lead to the widespread eviction 
of indigenous peoples.47 The Action Plan for the implementation of the PRAI even advocates 
field-testing FDI before rolling out large-scale projects that could impact adversely on the 
food security goals. Similarly, the Action Plan also supports continually modifying the think-
ing on what the most positive form of FDI for food security is for the specific state.48  
 
In one sense, the obligation only to encourage FDI that has a positive effect expressly on food 
security is an aspirational goal for the host state.49 The obligation is contained in the Rome 
Declaration on World Food Security 1996 and further underpinned by the later 2009 Declara-
tion. As Declarations, they are not binding instruments in international law as such and there-
                                                 
41 World Food Summit Plan for Action 1996 above n. 35, Objectives 2.1(b), (c) & 2.3(d). Five Rome Principles 
for Sustainable Global Food Security, Principle 5. 
42 World Food Summit Plan for Action 1996 above n. 35, Objectives 2.(c). 
43 Report of the High Level Development Working Group: Options for Promoting Responsible Investment in 
Agriculture, (2011) FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD & UN G-20 Joint Report, 4. 
44 FAO, IFAD, UN & World Bank, Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Live-
lihoods and Resources, March 2010, TD/B/C.II/CRP.3, Principle 6. 
45 Note the reality is definitely different. See section 2 above infra. 
46 These options are only if they reduce food insecurity in fact. The International Land Coalition notes that not all 
contract farming is positive for the local producer: Land Rights and the Rush for Land, above n 30, 42-44. 
47 Options for Promoting Responsible Investment in Agriculture, above n 43, 4. On the problems of displacement 
within specific weak states see Finnesha above n 9. 
48Report of the High Level Development Working Group: Options for Promoting Responsible Investment in 
Agriculture above n 43, Action Plan point 4. 
49 For the relationship between food security and the right to food, see below section 3 infra.  
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fore cannot be regarded as ‘hard law’ whereby the state’s obligation could be enforced in pro-
ceedings before domestic courts and/or the International Court of Justice.50 They can only 
provide moral force and general guidance to the state to shape the FDI it attracts.  
 
The PRAI too were described in the Discussion Note prepared by the FAO, IFAD, the United 
Nations and the World Bank as, at best, “a toolkit of best practices, guidelines, governance 
frameworks and possibly codes of practice.”51 There is a move towards creating a model law, 
in which the PRAI would be enshrined, but this is only outlined in the third project under the 
Action Plan, and even then, it is only scheduled to be a discussion point.52 Even if the PRAI 
were contained in a model law, the normative power of such instruments is inevitably limited. 
 
The 2012 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land and Natu-
ral Resources also advocate that the host state should take “reasonable measures” to catalogue 
“all legitimate tenure rights holders” prior to agreeing to any FDI.53 These rights should then 
be guaranteed in domestic law, and individuals adversely affected by any expropriation of 
land or any other forms of interference with their rights should have access to justice and ade-
quate compensation.54 The host state is required to acknowledge land tenure rights of local 
producers, including customary tenure rights of indigenous peoples, even when all the land is 
actually owned by the state.55  
 
The Guidelines indicate that at the pre-investment stage, it is incumbent on the host state only 
to “promote and support” responsible investments that acknowledge the land tenure rights (in 
all their forms) and actively contribute to food security goals of the host state.56 Like the 
PRAI, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of the Tenure of Land and 
Natural Resources are not mandatory for the host state and can only, at best, act as series of 
moral obligations which the state takes into consideration when seeking to attract FDI. They 
                                                 
50 See Olleson, The Draft ICL Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, (2007) 
BIICL 10 on the scope of what will be “an internationally wrongful act” in Article 1. 
51 TD/B/C.II/CRP.3 above n 43, 4. 
52 Project 3: Action Plan for Responsible Agricultural Investment and Proposed G-20 Actions, in ibid.,9. 
53 FAO, Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security 11 May 2012 (Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land and Natural Resources). 
54 Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Land and Natural Resources above n 55, Article 3.1.1-4 
& 14 on restitution. 
55 Ibid. Articles 8 & 9. 
56 Ibid. Article 12.1. The state should also actively encourage small-scale FDI: Article 12.2. 
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clearly do not create rights that the individual can enforce, nor obligations on the investor, or 
the investor’s home state. 
 
Although it appears that the obligation on the host state to invite agro-FDI that improves, or at 
least does not impinge on food security is only enshrined in soft law, it is underpinned by du-
ties that states owe to their citizens in international and regional human rights law: specifical-
ly, the right to food and the right of indigenous peoples to use their land and exploit natural 
resources on that land for the purposes of feeding themselves.57 Whilst some commentators 
have questioned the precise nature of these rights’ normativity, it is clear that they are much 
closer to ‘hard law’ for the purposes of this analysis.58 
 
The right to food in international human rights law requires that “each individual alone or in 
community with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or 
means for its procurement.”59 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
General Comment 12, has further interpreted Article 11 to mean that food must be available 
in sufficient quantities and be of sufficient quality that it satisfies the dietary needs of individ-
uals. So, the food available must be culturally appropriate and sufficiently nutritious, in terms 
of adequate calorie content and safety, so that the individual thrives both medically and physi-
cally.60  
 
In addition, food must be accessible in ways that are sustainable and yet do not interfere with 
other human rights.61 Accessibility is understood in terms of both physical and economic ac-
cessibility. In other words, it must be possible either for the individual to feed themselves di-
rectly by working on productive land, (understood as an individual right to invest and produce 
food);62 or for the individual to gain access to food directly through adequate distribution, 
                                                 
57 UN Declaration on Human Rights 1948, Article 25 & specifically, Article 11 International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1976 on the right to food & Article 8 UN Declaration in the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/295, 13 September 2007 (A/61/53) & 
Article 2 UN ICESCR. Indigenous People’s rights to land are inextricably linked generally with cultural rights: 
see Weissner: “The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Challenges” (2011) 22(1) EJIL 
121. 
58 For example see Plant: “Social and Economic Rights Revisited” (2003) 14 Kings L.J. 1. 
59 Article 25 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, & Article 11 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: de Schutter, The Right to Food, above n 8, para 2. On the right to food, see Narula above n 
10, & Breining-Kaufmann: “The Right to Food and Trade in Agriculture” in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn & E. Bürgi-
Bonanomi (eds.), Human Rights in International Trade, (2005) OUP, 341. 
60 UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 above n 58, para 9 & 10. 
61 UN Doc.E/C12/1999/5, ibid.,para 8, 9 & 11. 
62 UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 ibid., para 12. 
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processing and market systems at a price which ensures that the food available is not prohibi-
tively expensive for the more vulnerable individuals in the state (understood as the collective 
right to eat food).63  
 
The status of the right to food as a human right places specific obligations on the host state 
therefore.64 This is understood as both a positive and negative obligation: if the host state has 
ratified the International Convention on Social and Cultural Rights, it must provide food for 
its citizens if they are “unable, for some reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to 
adequate food by the means at their disposal;” but primarily, it must refrain from taking 
measures, (duty to respect) or allowing third party encroachment (duty to protect) in such a 
way that would prevent its citizens from gaining access to “productive resources” they have 
previously utilised in order to provide food for themselves, and actively seek to “strengthen 
people’s access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihoods” (duty to 
facilitate).65  
 
This obligation would require the state not to encourage or enter into agreements for agro-FDI 
involving forced expropriation of land owned by local agricultural producers. Similarly, it 
would also require the host state to implement domestic legislation that guarantees the rights 
for its citizens (and their representatives) and provides remedies where those rights are violat-
ed by allowing the establishment of agro-FDI that violated those rights.66 Information asym-
metries in weak states mean that it is often difficult for individuals to exercise those rights 
anyway. To the extent that guaranteeing the right to food and protection of property are both 
duties on the host state, failure to adhere to that duty would be regarded potentially as an “in-
ternationally wrongful act” by the state under the International Law Commission’s Articles on 
State Responsibility.67 Although there is a real question about the political (and legal) viabil-
ity of such proceedings based on the difficult link between the right to food and property and 
                                                 
63 UN Doc. E/C.12/1995/5 ibid., para 13.  
64 HJ Steiner, P Alston & R Gooman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals, 3rd ed. 
(2008) OUP, Ch 4, 313-347. See also FAO: Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the 
Right to Adequate Food in the Context of Food Security 2004, (2005), Article 17. 
65 Over 160 states have ratified the Convention, so it is widely accepted: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en. De Schut-
ter, above n 8, para 2. See generally: Narula above n 10, 692. 
66 Whether affected individuals would be able to access those rights in weak states is questionable, although 
these difficulties are ameliorated by NGO activities: see section 2 above infra. Note that NGO activities are not 
without their problems in this area, but a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See Brakman-Reisner & 
Kelly: “Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global Governance” (2010-11) 36 Brook.J.Int’l.L. 
1011. 
67 Article 28 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility above n 50. 
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agro-FDI before the investment has occurred when there may be little damage to individuals 
at this stage. 
 
The right to food has also been incorporated into regional initiatives. As most weak states we 
refer to in this paper are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most important regional initiative 
is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adopted by the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU).68 The unique nature of the Charter means that an individual’s human 
rights are to be fully realised only in the context of their community as a whole.69 Non-
discrimination between individuals and peoples is therefore central to the ACHPR’s concept 
of economic, social and political rights.70  
 
Moving the focus to the community and away from the individual means that the right to food 
is understood to be a collective right for the host state’s population as a whole as part of its 
overall economic development strategy.71 Article 14 also specifically recognises the “right to 
property” which would potentially protect any local producers that did have some form of 
land tenure. However, it is possible for the state to encroach on this right if it is in the interest 
of the wider community, although such encroachment must be undertaken in accordance with 
national law and provided affected citizens would be effectively compensated for their loss.72 
Article 17 equally provides for respect for cultural ways of life and traditional ways of life, 
including agricultural production methods.73 
 
The Draft Guidelines and Principles on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights places further general obligations on the OAU states 
“to take measures to ensure enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights” including the 
                                                 
68 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5 (1982) 21 ILM 58. Note land grab is not only confined to sub-Saharan Afri-
ca, it also is found in other weak states, including Cambodia and Lao: L. Cotula: The Outlook on Farmland Ac-
quisitions, (2011), International Land Coalition, IIED & CIRAD, 2. 
69 Article 29(7) Draft Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights ibid.. 
70 See generally Okere: “The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems” (1984) 6 Hum.Rts.Q. 141, 
145. Note that the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has jurisdiction over some matters, but only to 
the extent that the state has ratified the African Court Protocol.   
71 Okere ibid., 148. 
72 Articles 14 & 21 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights above n 69 
73 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights ibid.. Note it is not possible for individuals to enforce their 
human rights via this route unless the state specifically allows this in their domestic legislation: Nigeria’s 4th 
Periodic Country Report: 2008-2010 on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in Nigeria, Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2011) 11. 
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right to food and the right to property.74 Such measures must be fully supported by effective 
domestic remedies.75 At the pre-investment stage, therefore, the host state must take “concrete 
and targeted steps” to ensure that the agro-FDI does not impede these individual and collec-
tive rights. The Draft Guidelines suggest that such steps must include the protection of indig-
enous peoples against expropriation of their land, as well as eviction. It is a key element of the 
Draft Guidelines that the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’ rights are protected.76 
Although the guidelines are in draft form, it is clear that they are an extension of human rights 
obligations already on the state. 
 
In essence, the instruments discussed so far suggest that the host state has an active obligation 
to only encourage agro-FDI that will actively add to that state’s food security. This obligation 
is not enforceable as ‘hard law’ in its own right, but is supported by human rights obligations 
in international law and regional initiatives that map on to at least some elements of the obli-
gation to promote food security in the context of agro-FDI, which are enforceable.77 Conse-
quently, the host state could be held accountable by its citizens and other states should it con-
done agro-FDI that does violate these rights. This places a heavy burden on the host state at 
the pre-investment stage in terms of the type of FDI it should attract, or refuse. The question 
to which we now turn is whether the same burden also falls on the investor’s home state and 
the investor itself. 
 
Food Security, FDI and the Investor 
At the pre-investment stage, there is very little hard law governing the behaviour of the inves-
tor. To the extent that the investor is a wholly private entity with its own commercial strategy, 
international investment law has nothing to say about the way it chooses how and where to 
invest. Even the concept of good faith only works against the host state. For example, if the 
investor has been promised inducements to invest, it will be held to deliver on those induce-
ments. This appears o be the case irrespective of the behaviour of the investor.78 International 
                                                 
74 Section II.A, Article 2, Draft Principles and Guidelines in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 24 October 2011: available at www.achpr.org/instruments/economic-
social-cultural/ . 
75 Draft Principles ibid., Article 36. 
76 Draft Principles ibid., Article 17. 
77 A detailed exploration of precisely how the human rights to food and property map on to the host state’s food 
security obligation is beyond the scope of this paper.  
78 Although this does depend on the precise terms of the investment contract: Thunderbird v Mexico, Arbitral 
Award, 26 January 2006, para 47 & Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France), [1974] ICJ Rep. 253, 268. See gen-
erally Reismann & Arsjani: “The Question of Unilateral Government Statements as Applicable Law in Invest-
ment Disputes,” (2004) 19 ICSID Review FILJ 328. 
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investment law is certainly not designed to compel the investor to consider the impact of its 
investment on the host state’s food security before it makes the investment decision. 
 
The underlying assumption in foreign investment law is rather that all parties are able to 
freely negotiate the terms of the investment. The resulting investment therefore represents the 
compromise between the competing pros and cons of the investment.79 In other words, the 
very nature of FDI is thought to be positive for all parties and the law is merely the legal un-
derpinning of this mutual benefit. The only hard law limitation may be that the investor can-
not invest in a way that breaches domestic law.80 The extent to which this helps weak states 
combat the problems of agro-FDI at the pre-investment stage is questionable.81  
 
The only potential constraint on the investor to invest in ways that do not undermine the host 
state’s food security is through soft law. Principle 2 of the PRAI states that any investment 
should not jeopardise the host state’s food security.82 This principle is primarily aimed at the 
host state, but it is also implicit in Principle 2 that the investor acts in a way that does not un-
dermine the food security of the host state. Principle 5 places a specific commitment on the 
investor to ensure any project it is about to enter into respects the host state’s “rule of law, 
industry best practice” and results in “durable shared value.”83 Clearly this is a commitment 
that is meant to cross into the post-investment stage too, but inevitably the investor is sup-
posed to be under a minimum obligation to check that its planned investment does not violate 
this commitment.  
 
Agro-FDI projects should be assessed by the investor for their technical and economic viabil-
ity, prior to the investment.84 Due diligence all along the supply chain from the investment to 
the consumer should be undertaken by the investor before the investment takes place to check 
for possible impact on the hosts state’s food security, its citizens’ right to food and violations 
                                                 
79 World Bank: “Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment” (1992) 2 Legal Framework for the 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 35. 
80 E.g. UK Model BIT 2005, Article 2(1). See generally R. Dolzer & C. Schreuer: Principles of International 
Investment Law, 6-7. 
81 See section 2 above infra. 
82 PRAI above n 44. 
83 Ibid. 
84 FAO, IFAD, UN &World Bank Joint Report, Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments that Respect 
Rights, Livelihoods and Resources, (Extended Version)  above n 44, 13. 
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of land tenure rights.85 Whilst there is great hope that these Principles will embed into nation-
al law at some later point, they are currently unenforceable against the investor.86 
 
Food Security, FDI and the Investor’s Home State 
For the investor’s home state, an interesting picture emerges at the pre-investment stage. Alt-
hough the obligation to provide food security is “nationally articulated,” this does not neces-
sarily mean that the state must focus solely on its own population’s food security needs. Ra-
ther, the obligation has two dimensions: a state must be inward-looking to ensure its policy 
meets the needs of its own citizens; but, equally, it must be outward-looking. The precise na-
ture of this outward-looking dimension to food security is uncertain. It is clear from the Rome 
Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security, as well as the Camp David Declaration, that 
the G8 feel an obligation to weak states to provide financial assistance and capacity building 
and support to enable those weak states to realise their food security commitments.87 Howev-
er, what is less clear is whether there is an over-arching, deeper commitment for states (not 
just the G8) to ensure activities within their own jurisdiction (including the activities of some 
of their corporations investing in weak states) do not impinge on the food security of third 
states.88  
 
The definition of food security in the 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food Security does 
appear to support some outward obligation beyond that of providing development aid and 
assistance. It clearly states that food security is when “all people” at “all times” have access to 
nutritiously appropriate food, and not merely when the state’s own population have that ac-
cess. This interpretation is further substantiated by the Rome Principles for Sustainable Global 
Food Security, which specifically recognise that resolving food security requires “mutual re-
                                                 
85 Ibid.15; also see examples of private initiatives like GlobalGAP: ibid., 15. 
86 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations does require the investor to behave in a way that is 
‘ethical’ and complies with the domestic laws of the state in which the FDI takes place. Although the Guidelines 
exhort a general standard of behavior by the MNC, they only really ‘bite’ once the FDI has taken place: OECD: 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 25 May 2011: Annex 1 Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (2011) OECD, Principle I:3. The obligation on the investor and the investor’s home 
state to monitor compliance with human rights obligation through the National Contact Points only starts after 
the FDI is made: Principle IV generally. 
87 May 2012, para 16. 
88 This argument is predicated on the view that the obligation to guarantee food security is not always synony-
mous with the right to food: the two concepts are not always linked in the international declarations e.g. The 
Rome Declaration on World Food Security assumes a distinction, above n 35, para 1. A deeper discussion of this 
issue is beyond this paper, but on the general content of food security see Smith: “Food Security and Internation-
al Agricultural Trade Regulation: Old Problems, New Perspectives,” in JA McMahon & M. Desta (eds): Hand-
book on International Agricultural (2012) Edward Elgar, 31 
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sponsibility” and “accountability” of all states. For the investor state, this could be read to 
mean that it only has an obligation to provide financial assistance and development for weak 
states to implement their own effective agro-FDI investment strategy that does not infringe 
the right to food and adversely impact on their own food security. But, equally, this statement 
could be read to imply the deeper obligation. Just because state practice has evolved to think 
of this as an obligation as a duty for capacity building, does not mean that it cannot also sus-
tain a different interpretation.  
 
The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (MNCs) do require the investor’s home 
state to “encourage the positive contributions” MNCs can make towards the right to food, the 
right to property and the rights of indigenous peoples in host states.89 At the pre-investment 
stage, this is a mere general exhortation that the investor’s home state encourage investors to 
have an ethical investment policy, rather than requiring them to have a role in controlling how 
they make their FDI decisions per se.90 The investor’s home state’s behaviour is monitored by 
the Investment Committee as part of its general obligation to monitor the effectiveness of the 
Guidelines overall.91 The OECD Guidelines are not enforceable vis-à-vis the investor’s home 
state, although there will be moral pressure to comply with them.92 
 
Whether these commitments in the Rome Declaration and the OECD Guidelines on MNCs to 
expressly preserve the food security of third states have reached the status of customary inter-
national law is debatable. However, some investor home states, like the European Union 
(EU), have entered into specific agreements with some host states to carefully monitor FDI 
from investors incorporated in EU states. Article 40 the Interim Economic Partnership 
Agreement between the Eastern and Southern Africa States and the EU places an obligation 
on the (EU) investor state to “create an environment for sustainable and equitable economic 
investment… including Foreign Direct Investment…from the EC Party.”93 The EPA creates 
an asymmetric obligation on EU investor home states to generally support the encouragement 
of FDI therefore, and also to actively promote positive co-operation between the investor and 
the local indigenous population.94 There is also an express recognition of the need to support 
                                                 
89 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations above n 87, Principle II:2. 
90 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations ibid., Principle I:2.  
91 OECD, Decision of the OECD Council on the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, June 2000 
C(2000)96/Final, 19 July 2000, Principle II:1. 
92 OECD: Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Text and Commentary, (2011) 13, para 1. 
93 2012/196/EC, 24 April 2012, OJ(2012) L111/1,17. 
94 Ibid., Article 40(1)(d). 
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protection of host state natural resources, like water.95 Unlike the OECD Guidelines for 
MNCs, these obligations can be ‘enforced’ through dispute settlement proceedings in the 
EPA.96 There are detailed provisions in the EPA for the possibility of consultations in the 
event of a dispute, arbitration and, ultimately, the withdrawal of any offending measure.97 
Whilst this is clearly an important breakthrough in the creation of ‘hard law’ to ensure FDI 
does not undermine food security, in reality, the EPA does not specifically address the key 
concerns of agro-FDI that we set out in section 2 above. Instead, there is a general commit-
ment to address agriculture in later negotiations.98 
 
b. Post-Establishment Stage 
It is clear from the discussion in section 2 above that many of the problems associated with 
agro-FDI mainly occur after the investment contract has been concluded and the investment 
project is being implemented. This is often the point where local producers are displaced and 
local land tenure rights ignored as land is cleared for the investor, water rights are being vio-
lated, and promises to strengthen infrastructure by the investor fail to materialise and the ac-
tivities of the investor start to impact adversely on the host state’s food security and the hu-
man rights of its citizens.  
 
Obligations on the Host State 
At the post-establishment stage, the host state is still under an ‘obligation’ to pursue a food 
security policy that supports the right to food, land tenure rights and the rights of its indige-
nous peoples despite the activities of the investor.99 The problem is that the host state’s ability 
to force the investor to run its investment in ways that do not violate those rights is greatly 
weakened by the under regulation and over protection of the investor. All the obligations on 
the investor to undertake the investment in accordance with the host state’s food security (and 
human right to food, property and indigenous peoples’ rights) are contained in soft law; 
whereas all the obligations on the host state to protect the investor are contained in hard law 
in the BIT, regional and international investment law.  
 
                                                 
95 Ibid., Article 49(2) 
96 Ibid. Chapter IV. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid. Article 53(f). 
99 The hard law/soft law nature of these commitments is discussed above in section 3 infra.E.g. Voluntary Guide-
lines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security, above n 55, para 4. 
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After investment, foreign investment law assumes that the balance of power shifts from the 
investor to the host state because the host state retains the sovereign right to change the law, 
or act in such a way that the investment becomes economically non-viable for the investor.100 
Model BITs, regional and international investment law work on the assumption that it is criti-
cal that the investor is protected from such violations.101 If the host state wishes to act post-
investment to re-instate some limited land tenure rights, promote greater use of partnerships 
between the investor and local producers, or impose caps on ‘blue’ water usage for irrigation, 
this will be regarded as a violation of the investor’s rights.102 Some case law, especially in 
NAFTA and the 2012 revision of the US Model BIT, does seem to be showing some amelio-
ration of this investor-bias, but the ‘hard law’ in this field will still make it very difficult for 
the host state to require the investor to respect its food security post-investment. Several prob-
lems arise. 
 
On investment, the investor has the right to ‘fair and equitable’ treatment of its investment: 
that is, “investments shall ‘at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall en-
joy full protection and security in the territory’ of the reciprocating host state.”103 This obliga-
tion on the host state is divided into two main categories: a general obligation to fair and equi-
table treatment and full protection throughout the period of the investment; and a general right 
to non-discrimination both in terms of national treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) 
treatment. For agro-FDI post-investment, the specific fair and equitable treatment standard 
and the national treatment obligation are the most important.104 These standards have been 
developed through individual arbitration decisions in BIT and regional arbitration proceed-
ings, although questions remain whether these standards are sufficiently ingrained to reach the 
status of customary international law.105 The consequence is that the full scope of these obli-
gations is decided on a case-by-case basis, usually under the relevant BIT or regional treaty 
                                                 
100 L. Cotula: Human Rights, Natural Resources and Investment in a Globalized World, (2012) Routledge, 62-73. 
101 On the general incidence of BITs in Sub-Saharan Africa and a detailed study of their terms see Cotula ibid. 
102 On the scope of these problems see section 2 above infra. 
103 C. McLachan, L. Shore & M. Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, (2008) 
OUP, para 7.02. 
104 MFN can mean that more favourable terms in other BITs that the host state has signed up to can operate in 
favour of the investor too. This can ratchet up the positive commitment to protect the investment beyond that in 
the BIT covering the specific agro-investment that forms the subject-matter of the dispute: see McLachlan, Shore 
& Weiniger ibid., paras 7.161-7.169.  
105 See generally, Dolzer: “Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties” (2005) 39 
Int.’l Lawn 87. The precise nature of the doctrine of precedent in investment arbitration and the interpretation of 
the scope obligations over time is controversial: Roberts: “Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpre-
tation: The Dual Role of States” (2010) 104 AJIL 179. 
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covering the investment, although tribunals often follow previous decisions from various tri-
bunals. 
 
The host state cannot act in a way which impedes the investor’s specific right to fair and equi-
table treatment of its investment. In model BITs, this is often expressed as a duty not to “in 
any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, 
use or enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of nationals or companies” of the 
investor.106 The 2012 US model BIT states this to be a “minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens” consistent with the US’ obligations in relation to diplomatic protection in general pub-
lic international law.107 For the US therefore, this provision is one of due process only: the 
investor should expect to have access to civil, criminal and administrative proceedings if the 
terms of its investment are altered post-investment, but the duty does not extend further than 
that. Other arbitral tribunals have interpreted it to be a higher standard in the context of other 
BITs.108  
 
What is “fair and equitable treatment” must be addressed on a case-by-case basis, but in es-
sence, when the host state is trying to re-orient the investment back towards its own food se-
curity goals, it must not act in a way that could be regarded as arbitrary.109 This is understood 
to be an overall obligation to act in good faith in a way that “does not affect the basic expecta-
tions” that the investor could legitimately have when making the investment.110 It encom-
passes not going back on any contractual or regulatory promises made to the investor at the 
pre-investment stage; a duty to fully reveal any rules and obligations in national law before 
the investment takes place and also an obligation on the host state to guarantee the contractual 
rights of the investor.111 The tribunals’ focus is on whether there is a stable environment for 
the investor in the host state, and not whether the investor is, or is not complying with human 
rights per se.112 
 
                                                 
106 Sri Lankan BIT Article 2 cited in McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger above n 104, 208.   
107 Article 5: 2 US Model BIT 2012: http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm 
108 US Model BIT 2012 Annex A & B. Azurix v Argentina Award 14 July 2006. 
109 Mondev v The United States, 11 October 2002, (2005) 42 ILM 85 & ELSI (United States v Italy) (1989) ICJ 
Rep. 15 
110 TECMED v Mexico 29 May 2003, (2004) 43 ILM 133. 
111 Saluka v Czech Republic, 13 November 2000, (2001) 40 ILM 1408, 1438 & Metaclad Corp v Mexico, Award 
30 August 2000 (2002) 5 ICSID Reps 209. 
112 Occidental v Ecuador Award, 1 July 2004, 12 ICSID Rep 59 para 191. 
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Whilst the host state might think about readjusting its BIT (to the extent it has the negotiating 
power to do so) to insist the investor comply with human rights, the difficulty is that if the 
state has not done this before the investment (or simply been unable to do this), then after 
investment, this may be regarded as a breach of the BIT possibly entitling the investor to 
compensation.113 BITs often contain umbrella clauses which guarantee the rights in the BIT 
and stabilisation clauses too that bind the investor and the host state to the domestic law as it 
stands at the time of the investment.114 Unless the right to food and land tenure rights are fully 
enshrined in national law therefore, this will be problematic for the host state. Displaced local 
producers cannot bring the claim themselves. The tribunal too is not under an obligation to 
consider other areas of law, like the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights- 
arguably with the possible exception of jus cogens. In this case, the tribunal could find a (nar-
row or broad) conflict between the host state’s human rights obligations to its local producers 
and indigenous land rights’ holders with the terms of the BIT, and then allow the human 
rights obligations as jus cogens to trump the host state’s obligations to the investor under the 
BIT. To the extent of the conflict, the terms of the BIT would be void.115 
 
As part of the overall obligation to accord the investor ‘fair and equitable’ treatment of their 
investment in general, many BITs include specific national treatment provisions. Under these 
terms, the host state is required to “accord treatment no less favourable than that which the 
host state accords to its own investors.”116 The requirement is therefore not to treat agro-
investors any differently to the state’s own investors. The national treatment obligation only 
applies once the FDI is established. 
 
This provision is difficult for weak states in the context of food security. Our discussion 
above in section 2 shows that FDI may cause problems for food security that can be traced to 
the sheer size of the investment being made. There is no hard and fast rule here, but in weak 
states it may be that there are very few local sources of investment that can even make a con-
tribution to the state’s food security. This means that the basis of comparison for the purposes 
                                                 
113 Ibid.,, para 184. 
114 On stabilisation & umbrella clauses see generally McLachan, Shore and Weiniger above n 104, ch 4.  
115 Article 53 and 64 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Conflict may be difficult to find: see A. 
Orakhelashvili: Peremptory Norms in International Law, (2008) OUP, Ch. 6. On the specific interaction of in-
vestment norms and human rights norms see Karamanian: “Human Rights Dimensions of Investment Law” in E. 
de Wet & J. Vidmar (eds): Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights, (2012) OUP, 236, 237. 
The tribunal may instead try to argue there is no conflict, and then read the BIT and human rights obligations in 
a way that reconciles the two. 
116 Dolzer & Stevens above n 81, 63-65. See 1989 Ghana-China BIT cited in Cotula: Human Rights, Natural 
Resource and Investment Law in a Globalized World above n 101, 68. 
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of assessing whether the investor is accorded national treatment can be difficult. Tribunals 
have taken an expansive approach too to precisely who the equivalent ‘national’ comparator 
investor is.117  
 
In Occidental v Ecuador, the equivalent ‘national’ investor was held to be all local producers 
of the similar product; a potentially very wide category for agricultural production. This inter-
pretation clearly creates problems too if most local production is undertaken by small-scale 
production and/or by indigenous peoples, and it is precisely their collective right to invest in 
food production as part of their right to food that the host state is trying to protect. Inevitably, 
the investor will be treated differently in such circumstances, even if the legislation designed 
to protect the human rights of its citizens might be phrased in a non-discriminatory way on its 
face.118  
 
In SD Myers v Canada, a NAFTA panel stated that it might be possible to take the overall 
objectives of the treaty into consideration when determining whether the investor had been 
treated differently.119 The panel pointed to the fact that NAFTA contains clauses that require 
that investment should not be undertaken in a way that violates social (i.e. labour standards) 
and environmental concerns. Should the host state take action against the investor in those 
cases, the panel thought this would be sufficient to push the investor into a different category 
to that of the domestic producer for the purposes of determining national treatment.120 It could 
follow that if there is a clause in the BIT that provides specifically for different levels of pro-
tection on the basis of ‘public interest,’ this may be sufficient to justify the different treatment, 
but only if the tribunal is minded to follow the same line as the NAFTA panel. However, the 
precise circumstances where this differentiation can be justified, is as yet uncertain.121  
 
Changes to the terms of the investment once it has been made are likely to amount to an ex-
propriation of the investors’ assets. Expropriation can be made directly, like, for example, 
where the host state takes back specific land tenure rights given to the investor for their biofu-
                                                 
117 See generally Dolzer & C. Schreuer above n 81, 178-186. 
118 See Cotula, Human Rights, Natural Resources and Investment in a Globalized World above n 101, 60-61. 
119 First Partial Award, 13 November 2000, (2001) 40 ILM 1408, para 250. 
120 Ibid. para 250. 
121 Dolzer & Schreuer above n 81, 181-183 for a detailed analysis of the tribunal findings on this area. For the 
specific instances in developing country (i.e. capital importing host states) see Cotula: Human Rights, Natural 
Resources and Investment in a Globalized World, above n 101, 68-69. The degree to which the panel and Appel-
late Body findings on national treatment in WTO law are used to interpret national treatment obligations in in-
vestment treaties remain controversial: Pope & Talbot, Award on Merits, 10 April 2001, (2002) 122 ILL 352 
paras 45-63 & 68-69 c/f Occidental v Ecuador above n 113, para 176. 
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el production. Alternatively, expropriation can occur indirectly when, for example, the state 
decides to require the investor to enter into producer partnerships, insurance schemes, or local 
content purchasing requirements of the type endorsed by PRAI, after the investment has been 
made.122 Indirect expropriation can be found through gradual accretion of legalisation that 
works to remove the rights of the investor over time to the point where the investor’s control 
over the investment is effectively neutralised.123 The critical point seems to be when the in-
vestor has been “substantially deprived” of the economic value of the investment as a matter 
of fact, taking into account the duration and level of the deprivation.124  
 
In direct and indirect expropriation, the host state has the sovereign right to expropriate the 
investment, but it must do so in a way that accords with general rules of international law and 
any specific terms of the regional treaty or the BIT. In general, any expropriation must be 
non-discriminatory, for a public purpose and be undertaken in accordance with due process.125 
These criteria are cumulative.126 It is clear that the state has very wide discretion regarding 
what is deemed to be a ‘public purpose,’ which could include expropriation on human rights 
grounds, or even, preventing the investor exporting crucial biofuel on food security grounds. 
However, the host state must actually show that the expropriation is for that public purpose; it 
is not enough merely for them to say that it is.127  
 
The expropriation also cannot be for purely political reasons because the host state has now 
decided to protect some groups of producers and not others, but instead needs to have some 
legal (objective) justification.128 If the tribunal finds that expropriation has occurred, then the 
host state is required to pay compensation to the investor that is ‘prompt, effective and ade-
quate.’129 Under BITs, it is still uncertain whether a “full” compensation is due for both legit-
imate and illegitimate expropriation, or whether only illegitimate expropriation requires great-
er compensation.130 
 
                                                 
122 See discussion above of pre-investment stage infra. 
123  See Dolzer & Schreuer above n 81, 107. 
124 CMS v Argentina, 12 May 2005, (2005) 44 ILM 1205, Middle East Cement Shipping v Egypt, 12 April 2002, 
(2005) 7 ICSID Reps 178, para 107 & Teenor v Hungary, 13 September 2006, para 70. 
125 On expropriation generally see Dolzer & Schreuer above n 81, Ch.6. 
126 Ibid., 91. 
127 Amoco International Finance Corp v Iran (1987) 15 Iran-USCTR 189 & ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC 
Management Limited v The Republic of Hungary, 2 October 2006, 432-33. 
128 British Petroleum Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd v Libya, (1973) 53 ILR 297. 
129 The ‘Hull’ Formula: (1936) 55 AJIL Supp. 181. 
130 See discussion by Cotula, Human Rights, Natural Resources and Investment in a Globalized World above n 
101, 64.  
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There is a sense that if the hosts state’s activities can be said to “regulatory,” then it will not 
amount to expropriation.131 The key considerations appear to be the degree to which the in-
vestor’s rights are interfered with. Taking back tracks of land from the investor to give back to 
local producers would fall into the category of expropriation as it completely neutralises the 
value of the investment. Adjusting the terms of the investment to take into consideration some 
of the issues in the PRAI may be said to be regulatory, especially if the readjustment does not 
‘enrich’ the producer, but neutralises the balance of power between the investor and those 
producers.  
 
Regulation is something that an investor is said to be able to “reasonably expect” when decid-
ing whether or not to invest.132 Arguably, a host state deciding to implement international 
human rights obligations within its territory should be something that any legitimate investor 
would, or at least, should expect. Interestingly, the 2012 US Model BIT specifically states, 
“non-discriminatory actions…that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public wel-
fare objectives…do not constitute indirect expropriations.”133 It is unclear how tribunals will 
interpret the scope of this obligation, but it does at least appear to cover the instance where the 
host state legislates to further guarantee the human rights of its citizens.  
 
The Investor’s Rights and Obligations 
Even with the gradual easing of the strictures on what constitutes a breach of the BIT requir-
ing the host state to compensate the investor, it is still clear that there is a heavy bias in favour 
of protecting the investor’s rights in hard law. By contrast, the obligations on the investor to 
not undermine the host state’s citizens’ right to food, and land tenure rights, and the host 
state’s food security generally is all contained in soft law.  
 
For example, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security specifically requires non-state 
actors, like large-scale investors, to “respect human rights and legitimate tenure rights.”134 
This is fulfilled if the investor conducts appropriate management assessments during the 
course of the investment to continuously check its activities are not infringing these rights and 
if the investor puts in place grievance procedures for any local land tenure right holders to 
                                                 
131 Dr B Schwartz separate opinion in SD Myers v Canada under Article 110 NAFTA, 8 ICSID Reports 4 
132 SD Myers v Canada above n 120, 109. 
133 2012 US Model BIT above n 108, Annex B 4(b) emphasis added. 
134 Above n 55, para 3.2. 
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make a complaint.135 Under paragraph 3.2 of the Guidelines, the investor’s behaviour should 
also be monitored by the investor’s home state, and, in case of violation of the human rights, 
the investor’s home state should bring proceedings against the investor.136 The PRAI too call 
for investor participation in the continued monitoring of the positive (and negative) effects of 
their investment within the host state. Both instruments only contain general exhortations 
about the behaviour of the investor at best, although clearly there could be a degree of moral 
pressure exerted when violations of these principles are revealed.137 
 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises also places positive obligations on agro-
investors who are also multinational corporations (MNCs) to respect the human rights of any 
local producers and indigenous peoples affected by their activities.138 Agro-investor MNCs 
should also “encourage local capacity building,” by working closely with the local communi-
ty; should maximise local employment opportunities; should not push for loopholes in the 
BIT to protect themselves from domestic human rights legislation and should introduce their 
own monitoring systems to check they are adhering to the guidelines.139 All of which mirror 
the general exhortation on all investors in the PRAI. MNCs should also have their own policy 
on human rights, which should include how they plan to address human rights violations and 
how they carry out their activities in ways which does not infringe human rights. MNCs must 
also carry out “human rights due diligence” along the entire supply chain.140  
 
The MNC’s human rights policy should go beyond the legal duty to respect the human rights 
of the local producers that may be contained in the domestic law of the host state, and instead 
ensure the MNC fully complies with internationally recognised human rights’ obligations.141 
The policy should be approved at the highest level of the organisation; made public; ‘opera-
tionalized’ throughout all the MNC’s policies and specifically stipulate that all the MNC’s 
employees will respect the human rights of those affected by the investment.142 One of the 
difficulties for local agricultural producers is often access to new technology, for example, to 
increase crop yields. Principle IX of the Guidelines further recognises that MNCs should 
                                                 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 NGO campaigns can be very successful in highlighting abuses by MNCs in other areas of human rights: e.g. 
Boycott NIKE campaign for abuses of labour rights: http://clrlabor.org/alerts/DateUnknown/sarah_cox.html.  
138 OECD Guidelines on MNCs, Revision, 25 May 2011 above n 87, II:2. 
139 Ibid., paras II: 3, II:4, II:5 & II:7. 
140 Ibid. Chapter IV: paras IV:1-6. 
141 OECD, Guidelines on MNCs above n 87, Commentary paras 38-39. 
142 Ibid., paras 44 & 46. 
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“where practicable…permit the transfer and rapid diffusion of technologies and know-
how…” to local producers.143  
 
Obligations on the Investor’s Home State 
Unlike the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security and the PRAI, in the case of the OECD 
Guidelines on MNCs, the investor’s host state is required to set up National Contact Points to 
generally monitor the activities of their MNCs.144 This monitoring obligation encompasses 
advertising the existence of the Guidelines and promoting their objectives.145 More important-
ly, it also requires the National Contact Points to resolve any issues that arise from the activi-
ties of the MNC and share information about activities of MNCs located in other states.146  
 
The obligations on MNCs and the investor’s home state contained in the OECD Guidelines on 
MNCs are ultimately soft law. The success of National Contact Points has been patchy. The 
UK NCP found it too difficult to decide whether the alleged labour rights abuses of British 
American Tobacco (BAT) in Malaysia had in fact taken place. It was able to uphold the com-
plaint by the Malaysian Trade Union Congress, however, that there was a duty to consult the 
Malaysian TUC on working practices prior to changing them.147  
 
In 2009, the UK National Contact Point did uphold a complaint by Survival International 
against Vedanta Resources plc for not consulting widely enough and in a timely fashion with 
the Dongria Kondh, a local indigenous community, who would have been adversely affected 
by the construction of a bauxite mine.148 In this case, the UK National Contact Point found 
that the human rights of the local community had been infringed, as Verdana Resources plc 
did not have a robust policy in place to address the human rights issues.149  
 
                                                 
143 Ibid.,, IX:3. For a discussion of the difficulties local producers have getting access to technology see section 2 
above infra. 
144 Amendment of the Decision of the Council on OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD 2011 
revision, see OECD: Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: A Commentary (2012), 68 paras 1-4. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. I:1. We are grateful to Christine Kaufmann for alerting us to the successful activities of the National 
Contact Points.  
147 Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises (the Guidelines): Complaint from the Malaysian Trade Union Congress against British American Tobacco 
Malaysia Berhad (Malaysia): March 2011 available from: http://www.bis.gov.uk/nationalcontactpoint  
148 Final Statement by the UK Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Compliant 
from Survival International against Verdanta Resources plc: September 2009. 
149 Ibid. 1. 
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The National Contact Point only makes recommendations in the first instance, but there is a 
facility for follow-up dialogue and an exchange of views between the affected party, the MNC 
and the National Contact Point, which does yield positive results in some instances. For ex-
ample, in the BAT case, the company reported that it had subsequently undertaken a review of 
its policies and, in response to the comments made in the first report, agreed to refine the 
terms of those policies.150 However, in the case of Verdana Resources plc, although Survival 
International provided evidence of repeated violations of the guidelines, together with wide-
spread human rights abuses, Verdana Resources plc denied the allegations. As the National 
Contact Point rather sadly states in the Follow-Up Report: “The publication of this statement 
is the final stage in this Specific Instance.”151  
 
It seems that adherence to the recommendations of the National Contact Point will occur if it 
is in the interests of the MNC to comply. The fact that there appears little that the NCP can do 
if the MNC decides not to comply in the long term reduces the ‘hard law’ effect of the Guide-
lines. As the discussion shows, the strongest control over the investor comes through the BIT 
and foreign investment law in general. 
 
4. Conclusions 
For one, we consider that no government can have a legitimate interest in protecting invest-
ments violating human rights, social or environmental norms, or the right to food. When such 
cases come to the limelight – often prompted by NGO action and local media – many gov-
ernments are bound to first act on the case and, in a second step, consider regulatory changes. 
The changes required should have positive effects on food security and not be merely reflex 
reactions to the immediate problem. We argue that changes are required at both the pre-
investment and post-establishment stage to minimise the adverse impact on food security of 
the FDI.  
 
At the pre-investment stage, NGOs and the international community should support host 
states in their efforts to entrench the PRAIs and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Securi-
ty into national law. Host states do owe obligations to their own citizens not to violate their 
                                                 
150 Follow-Up Statement by the UK National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (the Guidelines): Complaint from the Malaysian Trade Union Congress against British American 
Tobacco Malaysia Berhad (Malaysia): July 2011.  
151 Ibid,1. 
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right to food and other land tenure rights and it is important that they not only develop capaci-
ty to meet these obligations, but also to implement them in ways that accord maximum benefit 
to their citizens. Equally, the investor’s home state arguably is under an obligation not to al-
low its investors to violate the right to food of third states’ citizens. It is critical therefore that 
the investor’s home state also embraces its obligation to ‘police’ the activities of its investors 
abroad. Some investors’ home states have already embraced this responsibility by bringing in 
anti-corruption legislation, but more could be done here. The investors should also see that 
being a ‘good global citizen’ by not undermining the host state’s food security can have a 
very positive impact on the returns to their investment. Work on international corporate social 
responsibility is continuing, but what is clear is that NGO campaigns in the past that high-
lighted ‘bad’ corporate behaviour can have a critical adverse effect on profits.152 
In addition to general capacity building at the post-investment, the host state should be en-
couraged to adopt a public interest clause in its BIT and regional trade agreements. Such a 
clause would transform the general ‘soft law’ exhortation on the investor to be a ‘good citi-
zen’ into ‘hard law. Commitments undertaken by the investor to build roads etc. as part of the 
investment, as well as to ensure its investment did not violate the host state’s citizens’ right to 
food and land tenure rights could be enforced through the terms of the clause. As we showed 
above, it may even be that failure to adhere to the terms of this clause will not amount to an 
expropriation requiring the payment of appropriate compensation for the purposes of interna-
tional investment law. We set out our proposal for such a ‘public interest’ clause below: 
 
Public Interest 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
1. To prevent a Contracting Party from taking measures necessary 
(1) For the protection of its national and local population’s food security as defined by 
relevant international organisations. 
(2) For the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, water, and livestock adverse-
ly impacted by the investments carried out by an investor of the other Contracting Party. 
(3) For the fulfilment of a Contracting Party’s international obligations relating to hu-
man rights as defined in relevant international treaties and standards. 
(4) For ensuring the enjoyment of all legitimate claims to land by rightful individual 
or communal landowners. 
                                                 
152 See generally Roy: “Trends in Global Corporate Social Responsibility Practices: The Case of Sub-Saharan 
Africa” (2010) VIII (III) International Journal of Civil Society Law 64. 
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2. The international and national dispute settlement bodies foreseen in this Agree-
ment shall hear complaints by duly interested stakeholders and on the basis, where relevant, 
of an independent impact assessment addressing all relevant economic, environmental and 
social aspects as well as taking into account the interests of all participants in the investment 
project. In their findings they shall ensure that 
(1) Such measures should not be applied in a manner that would constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade or investment. 
(2) Such measures shall be applied in good faith and in a non-discriminatory manner 
between investors. 
(3) Adequate and fair compensation would be provided to the investors of the other 
Contracting Party for all actions taken in full compliance with the investment agreement en-
tered into by the competent and duly authorised local or national authorities. 
